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DAMAGE, DESTRUCTION, DISTRESS: SHARED 
OWNERSHIP DEBACLES 
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Abstract
Shared ownership models of land use are part and parcel of our modern 
environment. In order to build high density, vibrant cities it is important to 
appreciate the types of problems that can occur where there is shared ownership 
on a single title of land. This article explores some of these problems, beginning 
with cross leases. After outlining the history, principles and essential characteristics 
of cross leases the article suggests that many of these problems could have been 
avoided if proposals made by the Law Commission in 1999 had been adopted. 
The article then analyses the Unit Titles Act 2010, aspects of which are working 
well, despite public concern about its effectiveness. However, there are a number 
of situations, especially in relation to insurance entitlements, where the Act does 
not apply, such as liability in negligence where damage has occurred to commercial 
or multiple use buildings and the role of contributory negligence. In situations of 
mixed commercial and residential use, problems arise as a result of definitional 
issues across a range of legislation, such as the Earthquake Commission Act 1993 
and the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006. Without careful 
consideration, the unintended consequences of these issues may well create 
impediments to building more vibrant cities. Finally, the article notes that central 
to any vibrant city will be the well-being of its residents. Both the cross lease and 
unit title models pose challenges in this sphere and careful thought should be given 
to balancing both the affordability and environmental benefits of higher density 
living with the need for all ages and types of people to be able to live together with 
easy access to services and open space.
I. Introduction
This paper addresses some of the problems that occur where there is shared 
ownership on a single title of land – in New Zealand such models comprise 
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cross leases, unit titles and retirement homes.1 Problems with the cross lease 
model were exacerbated after the Canterbury earthquakes and these may 
have been completely avoided if the warnings from the Law Commission 
had been heeded in 1999. When a building subject to the Unit Titles Act 
2010 is damaged or destroyed, but the plan is not cancelled, s 74 of that 
Act allows for a scheme to be settled to enable reinstatement. This provides 
a pragmatic tool for resolving disputes about how to conduct a remediation 
project clearly but when there is no agreement to reinstate, acute difficulties 
occur. Multiple use buildings have also posed problems for the Earthquake 
Commission (EQC) regime, particularly in dealing with determining the 
limits of “residential” use. The same problem has arisen in relation to the 
statutory regime under the Weathertight Resolution Services Act 2006 for 
“leaky” buildings and it seems apparent liability of builders and local bodies 
can arise whether or not the building is for commercial purposes, residential 
purpose, or both. Contributory negligence can be added to this mix.
II. Cross Leases 
The cross lease scheme was developed in the 1960s as a means of exploiting 
a loophole in the rules restricting subdivision of land. It provided separate 
titles to two or more flats in one building on one section without there being 
a subdivision of the land within the meaning of the Municipal Corporations 
Act 1954 (MCA 1954) or the Land Subdivision in Counties Act 1946.  Thus 
homeowners were able to “own” their own flats. In 1971, as a result of further 
amendments being made to the MCA 1954 and the Counties Amendment Act 
1961 (CAA 1961), it became possible for separate buildings on the same section 
to be cross leased, for example a conventional flat (being part of a building), 
a semi-detached town house, a free-standing town house or a conventional 
house. Nonetheless, the word “flat” continues to be used to describe any kind 
of cross leased dwelling. While the introduction of the Local Government 
Act 1964 (that replaced both the MCA 1954 and the CAA 1961) made little 
difference to cross leases (they still did not constitute a subdivision of land), 
a dramatic shift occurred when the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA 
1991) was passed. The grant of a cross lease is now a “subdivision of land”2 
1 The authors (together with Professor Jacinta Ruru of the Faculty of Law, University of 
Otago) are involved in a project funded by the Building Research Levy through the New 
Zealand Building Research Association New Zealand (BRANZ) and the New Zealand Law 
Foundation. The project, “Repairs, Renovation, Restoration, Demolition or Replacement of 
Multi-Dwelling Units on a Single Title”, addresses these issues and investigates, on a world-
wide scale, whether there are better models for shared ownership of land that New Zealand 
could adopt.  
2 Resource Management Act 1991, s 218(1)(a)(iv). 
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and a subdivision consent must be obtained for a cross lease development in 
accordance with the provisions of that Act.3 Nonetheless:4
[c]ross lease titles … continue to be used for some smaller 
urban housing projects because they remain cheaper and 
more convenient for the property developer. Following the 
coming into force of the UTA 2010,5 they may continue to 
be used, again for smaller developments, to avoid the costs 
and complexities, even for the developer, inherent in that 
Act. However, the cross lease scheme becomes unwieldy as 
larger numbers of flats are involved; unit titles are normally 
used for larger developments.
A. The characteristics of a cross lease 
The mechanics of the cross lease scheme were devised by using a 
combination of two provisions in the Land Transfer Act 1952: 
 - s 66 which enables the issue of a title in respect of leasehold interests; 
and 
 - s 72 under which tenants in common are entitled to a separate title. 
Thus, under a cross lease development, the owners6 of each of the flats are 
registered proprietors of the land (usually a fee simple estate, but occasionally 
a leasehold estate) as tenants in common in undivided shares, and all the 
tenants in common grant a lease of each flat to its owner, usually for a term 
of 999 years. Thus, each owner is both a lessor and a lessee. Originally, the 
purchaser of a cross lease property received two titles (as per ss 66 and 72 of 
the Land Transfer Act 1952), but subsequently there evolved the practice of 
issuing one title for both estates, commonly known as a composite title.
The individual lessees acquire the right to the exclusive possession of their 
particular flats. The part of the land that is not cross leased (that is, does 
not have a flat built on the land) remains in the possession of the owners as 
tenants in common as either common areas or restricted user areas attaching 
to a particular flat.
The problems that exist under this model of ownership for a multi-
dwelling unit on a single title were quick to surface and remain today despite 
a somewhat determined effort by the Law Commission in 1999 to instigate a 
3 Resource Management Act 1991, Part 10 (Subdivision and reclamations).  
4 D McMorland and T Gibbons, McMorland and Gibbons on Unit Titles and Cross Leases 
(Lexis Nexis NZ Limited, 2013) at 4.1. 
5 Unit Titles Act 2010. 
6 The noun “owner” is used loosely in this part of the article. A cross lease owner is both a lessor 
and a lessee - see comment of the Law Commission below at n 8.  
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managed system to phase them out. The following comment, made in 1994, 
is apposite:7 
The great disservice which local authorities have done to the 
general public for a large number of years by refusing to 
allow fee simple subdivisions … and forcing the use of the 
cross lease mechanism is only now beginning to surface in 
litigation. However, the flow has begun, the problems are 
constantly arising, and they will continue to do so for a long 
time in the future. 
B. The 1999 Law Commission Report
In its 1999 Report,8 the Law Commission identified the basic problem with 
the cross lease system as “public lack of awareness that there are problems”.9 
It noted aptly:10
Most cross lease owners, it may be suspected, think of 
themselves as owning their flats plus so much of the 
surrounding land as they may occupy to the exclusion of 
other cross lease owners (whether such exclusion rests on 
courtesy or custom or the rather sounder basis of a restrictive 
covenant). They may have been told by the kindly real estate 
agent … that they would be “as good as” owners. But of 
course they are in fact neither owners nor as good as owners 
… Common sense suggests, however, that with the passing 
of time and as buildings age or uses permitted in particular 
neighbourhoods change, the essentially unsatisfactory 
nature of this form of tenure will become more and more 
apparent.
Indeed, while the advantages of this model exist mainly for the developer 
of the land, there are many disadvantages for the flat owners. Those 
disadvantages include:11 lack of ownership of the flats (the lessees’ rights 
depend upon the terms of the cross lease); the lessee’s share in the estate in 
fee simple can be defeated; the rights of the lessee are different from those of 
an owner; the lessee’s rights of user of the restricted area might be controlled 
and limited by the terms of the lease; disputes are much more likely to arise 
because the lessees live in close proximity to one another and because of 
the complex nature of their rights inter se; the developer often prepares and 
7 D McMorland (1994) 6 Butterworths Conveyancing Bulletin 253 at 254.   
8 NZLC R 59 “Shared Ownership of Land” 1999. 
9 At [8].  
10 Above. 
11 This list is taken from McMorland and Gibbons, above n 4, at 4.18 where a more detailed 
description of the problems can be found.   
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registers the cross leases so a purchaser buying in often does so on a “take it or 
leave it” basis; and insurance.12
The Law Commission expressed considerable concern about the physical 
or economic life of a flat which undoubtedly would be far shorter than 999 
years:13 
Different buildings on the same lot may have different life 
expectancies. This will usually be so where a new “infill” 
housing is built on the same lot as an existing older dwelling. 
There is no machinery for resolving differences as to whether 
or not a cross lease scheme should be terminated, this being 
often the only sensible solution if one flat has reached the 
end of its economic life. A single cross lease owner would be 
able to prevent this.
The Law Commission made three suggestions: 
(i) Phasing out.   
 The Law Commission suggested the immediate prohibition   
 of  new cross lease schemes. There was widespread support   
 for this initiative.14
(ii) Voluntary conversion of cross lease schemes to subdivisions. 
 Not surprisingly, there were no objections to this proposal.
(iii) Mandatory conversion of cross lease schemes to  unit  title   
 schemes or subdivisions.  
 This third suggestion attracted considerable criticism.
One argument advanced by those who opposed this suggestion was that 
there was indeed an advantage for those holding under cross lease schemes – 
the ability to regulate the behaviour of neighbours living in close proximity. 
The Law Commission responded:15 
This contention seems over-sophisticated. We very much 
doubt whether the overwhelming majority of those acquiring 
cross leases look at the matter this way. If this is wrong and it 
is genuinely important to a cross lease owner that the leases 
comprising a particular scheme forbid (say) more than one 
budgerigar per flat, it is always possible to provide for that 
prohibition by means of a restrictive covenant … 
12 Insurance issues are discussed below. 
13 NZLC R 59, above n 8, at [12].  
14 See, for instance, the Real Estate Institute of New Zealand, the Auckland City Council, 
the Property & Land Economy Institute of New Zealand Incorporated, the New Zealand 
Institute of Surveyors and Local Government New Zealand. Housing New Zealand 
supported a ten year “phasing out” period.
15 NZLC R 59, above n 8, at [16]. 
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The Law Commission noted that a much more common argument was 
the cost of the conversion, particularly as it may affect older people with 
modest means. 
The Commission proposed a softer alternative – that mandatory conversion 
be achieved indirectly by a prohibition after the mandatory conversion date of 
the registration of any dealing affecting a cross lease other than a transmission 
or vesting order. Therefore, on the registration of any dealing other than a 
transmission or vesting order, cross lease owners would be required to convert 
their cross lease scheme to a subdivision or a unit title scheme. 
Unfortunately, while some of the Law Commission’s suggestions for unit 
titles were considered in the modelling of the Unit Titles Act 2010, none of 
its suggestions for dealing with the fraught cross lease housing model was 
adopted. Sixteen years later, problems with the model continue and have been 
exacerbated by the added complexities of repair and reinstatement, not to 
mention insurance woes, after the Canterbury earthquakes:16 
No legislative action has yet been taken though thousands 
of such situations exist throughout New Zealand affecting 
in many cases the most valuable asset of the lessee, his or 
her home. 
In 2011, a joint working group comprising Land Information New 
Zealand (LINZ), the New Zealand Law Society, the Auckland District Law 
Society and the New Zealand Bankers Association noted particularly two 
continuing problems: the construction of further improvements resulting 
in title requisitions and redocumentation of title on sale; and the increased 
litigation relating to consents of other cross lease owners to construction of 
improvements. It reiterated the need for action: 17 
Accordingly, conveyancing to meet the future needs of cross 
lease title owners will require an examination of cross leases 
with a view to their possible replacement or facilitating a 
simple transition to another form of title.
C. How to determine a cross lease development 
Without any legislative action to phase out this model of multi-dwelling 
units on a single title, there are only three ways to determine such a 
development: 
16 McMorland and Gibbons, above n 4, at 4.18.
17 Conveyancing 2020: The Future Conveyancing/Land Development Environment – Strategic 
Priorities and Initiatives (December 2011) (Land Information New Zealand, New Zealand 
Law Society, Auckland District Law Society Inc, New Zealand Banking Association) at 4.3 
(comment from Auckland District Law Society).    
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(i) Unanimous agreements from cross lease parties or initiative by a developer 
If there is unanimous agreement by all parties in a cross lease development to 
determine it, then the parties can surrender the cross leases and create a new 
title structure.18 If the transition is to a fee simple structure, requirements of 
the Resource Management Act 1991 or the relevant territorial authority may 
create difficulties and expense.19
Moreover, the growing trend for developers to undertake fee simple 
subdivision around individual units (some of which may share party walls) 
due to individual titles being more attractive to prospective purchasers 
attracted the following comment from a planner:20 
It is bound to create long term issues for rights of access 
to maintain/repair elements of the building. It foolishly 
eradicates the need for any formal maintenance plan that 
would keep the buildings looking tidy in years to come, and 
creates an issue for ongoing maintenance of shared services 
in the long term, such as onsite stormwater detention tanks 
etc, which have a limited life span.
(ii)  Court order 
If there is disagreement between cross lease parties, those parties wishing 
to convert the development into a fee simple title structure can apply to the 
Court under s 339(1) of the Property Law Act 2007 for an order for the 
“division of the property in kind among the co-owners”. The Court may, if 
appropriate, order that, subject to resource consent, the land be subdivided 
into separate fee simple titles.21  The Court has no jurisdiction to make an 
order for conversion to a unit title. Any such conversion is dealt with under 
the Unit Titles Act 2010. 
(iii) Unit Titles Act 2010 
A cross lease development may be converted into a unit title development 
under ss 191 – 200 of the Unit Titles Act 2010 but this method has attracted 
the following comment:22 
However, the Act’s “one size fits all” approach and heavy 
emphasis on governance and increased administration and 
associated costs makes it continually unlikely that owners in 
cross lease schemes, which are generally smaller, sometimes 
only two properties in an in-fill situation, will convert to 
unit titles.
18 See Kevdu Properties Ltd v Ko (2007) 8 NZCPR 23 in which the Court enforced such an 
agreement.  
19 D McMorland and T Gibbons, McMorland and Gibbons on Unit Titles and Cross Leases, above 
n 4, at 4.17. 
20 Result of on-line survey that was undertaken as part of the project described above in n1.
21 See, for instance, MacKenzie v Smythe [2012] NZHC 1113.  
22 McMorland and Gibbons, above n 4, at 4.18. 
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D. Insurance 
This paper borrows from an extremely useful, and clearly still highly 
relevant, discussion on the importance of insurance for cross lease 
developments that was given at an Auckland District Law Society seminar in 
1991.23 While this discussion looked at both cross leases and unit titles, due 
to changes in the Unit Titles Act 2010, these problems are now cross lease 
specific. 
Complications and risks with respect to insurance arise from two problem 
areas. 
The first arises from the owners’ interdependence:24
The cross lease units, because of their close relationship, 
construction and use of common facilities have particular 
problems which are not associated with or are not as serious 
for owners of individual dwellings. Examples of such 
problems are: 
Structural damage being caused to one unit because of fire 
in an adjoining unit – the  value of one unit being lowered 
because one or more of the other units in the building are 
burnt out and not reinstated. 
Your client’s lack of control over events in other units in the 
block which may cause damage to their unit, i.e. taps left on 
causing floods and unattended heaters causing fires. 
Multiplicity of parties in the case of reinstatement after 
damage – other owners and their mortgagees and insurers 
all can become involved. 
In a sense your client’s title depends on four walls, a roof 
and a floor. All of these can be destroyed so that your client’s 
title becomes practically useless: lines on a piece of paper but 
little else.    
The second complication involves the mortgagee:25
If your client owns an individual dwelling the problem of 
insurance concerns only the mortgagor and the mortgagee. 
In the case of a mortgage over a unit the other unit owners, 
their mortgagees and insurers become involved. They will 
23 P Merfield “Insurance on Cross-leases and Unit Titles” Auckland District Law Society 
Seminar Conveyancing Pot  Pourri (No 2) 1991.
24 At 1.1.3.
25 At 1.3.2. 
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want to insure that if a unit is damaged then it is reinstated 
as soon as possible. 
The commentator noted the implied provision in the then Property Law Act 
1952 concerning the application of insurance monies. The current provision 
is found in Schedule 2 of the Property Law Act 2007. If any buildings or 
improvements on mortgaged land are destroyed or damaged, the mortgagee, 
at its option, can apply the proceeds either in or towards: 26 
(a) rebuilding or repairing the buildings and 
improvements; or 
(b) payment of the principal amount, interest and other 
amounts secured by the mortgage even though such 
monies are not due to be repaid.
Therein arises a potential conflict between the interests of the mortgagor, 
the mortgagee and the other owners in the development. 
E. Prescient comments in Canterbury’s post-earthquake environment 
In the early findings of our on-line survey, two respondents returned the 
following comments that aptly reflect the concerns voiced 17 years ago.
1. Case study: owners/insurers:27
Our clients entered into a shared property scheme for rebuild 
of the five dwellings on a cross lease title. Three different 
insurers were involved. Four owners and their insurers very 
quickly agreed on matters but one owner created difficulties 
by requesting over $200,000.00 of betterment to which 
her insurer would not agree. This owner then engaged an 
“insurance advocate” to negotiate a cash settlement. The 
insurers told our clients that they would not go ahead with 
the rebuild of the remaining four properties because it was 
not practical. It was an “all or nothing” situation where 
either all owners were rebuilt under the scheme or they all 
cash settled. If they had all cash settled the practicalities of 
the site would have required them to arrange a joint rebuild 
anyway, so our clients were understandably keen to remain 
in the scheme. The problem dragged on for over a year until 
the insurers put a deadline on the situation. The only option 
at that point was for the hold out owner to opt back into the 
26 Property Law Act 2007, Schedule 2, Part 1 “Covenants, conditions and powers implied in 
mortgages over land”, at cl 3 “Application of insurance money”. 
27 Result of on-line survey that was undertaken as part of the project described above in n1.
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scheme and agree to its terms. Following a meeting between 
representatives from the insurance companies, their lawyer 
and each of the owners and their representatives, the fifth 
owner did opt back in and the rebuild is due to start in April 
[2016].             
2. Comment from a mortgagor:28 
The major issue was the insurer cash settling directly 
with some customers despite having the bank noted as 
an interested party. This left us with a seriously devalued 
security.  
 
It seems clear that one reform we will advocate in our final Report is a 
recommendation that the findings of the 1999 Law Commission Report be 
revisited and acted upon.
III. Unit Titles  
A. Schemes for Repair under s 74 of the Unit Titles Act 2010 
In New Zealand, unit title developments are a common method of 
owning residential, commercial and mixed commercial and residential 
property. However, the practical question of how repairs can be achieved, 
particularly where damage has occurred across both common property and 
principal units, can pose serious difficulties. Damage, and, in particular, 
damage caused by water or earthquakes, does not respect legal concepts such 
as common property or the private property of a particular unit. Often, it 
not only makes more economic sense for repairs to several parts of a building 
to be done to the same standard and at the same time, but it will also be 
necessary for those carrying out repairs to have access to both common and 
private property.
Fortunately, s 74 of the Unit Titles Act 2010 provides for the High Court 
to settle a scheme for reinstatement where a building (or other improvement 
comprised in any unit or on the base land) is damaged or destroyed, but the 
unit plan is not cancelled.29 Although a scheme under s 7430 has been referred 
to as a “remedy of last resort”,31 since 2007 it has become a popular avenue 
for those involved with a unit title development to facilitate repairs where 
28 Result of on-line survey that was undertaken as part of the project described above in n1.
29 Unit Titles Act 2010, s 74. 
30 Formerly s 48 of the Unit Titles Act 1972. 
31 Fraser v Body Corporate S63621 (2009) 10 NZCPR 674 at [97]. 
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unit title owners have reached an impasse. It is now viewed as the standard 
mechanism for resolving disputes.32 
However, a review of the case law since the leading decision33 was delivered 
in 2011 suggests that a significant majority of cases are uncontroversial, 
involving no respondent but requiring a hearing before a High Court judge. 
These cases (none of which actually resulted in a scheme being declined) 
indicate that s 74 is working well. However, the requirement for a full hearing 
before the High Court seems unnecessary. For matters which are essentially 
uncontested, this requirement adds to delay and costs, not only because of 
the need to wait for a hearing date, but also because of the costs associated 
with an in-person appearance by counsel. Moreover, it adds to the work of 
the High Court in ways that might usefully be avoided. As a result, this paper 
suggests that the jurisdiction of Associate Judges of the High Court should 
be expanded to include the ability to consider s 74 schemes at first instance. 
If the matter is straightforward, an Associate Judge should have the power to 
settle the scheme. However, if the matter is complex the ability to set it down 
for a defended hearing before the High Court should be retained.34 
That s 74 applications should be heard by an Associate Judge at first 
instance can be illustrated by reference to the cases which have been decided 
since the leading decision in Tisch v Body Corporate 318596.35 Tisch itself 
outlined a relatively straightforward three-step process for determining 
whether a scheme should be settled.36 Firstly, the court must be satisfied that 
the building has been damaged or destroyed. Secondly, if so satisfied, the 
court must decide whether a scheme is appropriate in the circumstances. 
Finally, if a scheme is considered appropriate, the court must decide what the 
terms of the scheme should be. There are a further five factors which must be 
considered in relation to this final step.37
32 McMorland and Gibbons above n4 at 3.33. 
33 Tisch v Body Corporate 318596 [2011] NZCA 420, [2011] 3 NZLR 679.
34 Interestingly, notwithstanding the apparent popularity of this section, there was an early 
debate in the literature regarding whether the provision could be used in this way. Rod 
Thomas argued that the courts have no jurisdiction to make such orders under either the 
1972 or the 2010 Acts (Rod Thomas “Schemes Following Destruction or Damage Under 
the New Zealand Unit Titles Regime” (2011) 17 NZBLQ 371). Thomas Gibbons disagreed, 
arguing that the approach taken by the courts has been proper, appropriate and supported by 
pragmatism (Thomas Gibbons “Season of the Tisch: A Response to Rod Thomas (Schemes 
under the Unit Title Regime)” (2012) 18 NZBLQ 147.) With the benefit of hindsight, it is 
now clear that Gibbons’ position is the correct one. Since the decision in Tisch, the High 
Court has had no hesitation in engaging with these applications and no argument along the 
lines of that suggested by Thomas appears to have been run, let alone accepted by the courts.
35 Tisch v Body Corporate 318596 [2011] NZCA 420, [2011] 3 NZLR 679.
36 At [35]. 
37 These include considering: what support there is for the scheme (a scheme with broad support 
is to be preferred); whether the scheme is appropriately detailed; the fact that the work should 
normally be done to the same standard and at the same time; and whether the terms of the 
scheme depart from the scheme of the Act or from the body corporate rules. If so, these 
departures should be no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve what is fair between 
unit owners in the circumstances. 
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Since the decision in Tisch there have been approximately 26 cases dealing 
with s 74 (or its predecessor). Of these cases, 19 of them appear to have been 
utterly non-controversial. Indeed, of these 19 cases, only one case recorded an 
appearance for a respondent (and one case involved 108 respondents). That sole 
appearance was to advise that that particular respondent no longer objected 
to the scheme. Moreover, the bulk of these cases are relatively short (often just 
three or four pages of judgment), there is often no recorded opposition to the 
settlement of the scheme, and they simply involve the judge noting that he or 
she is satisfied that the requirements laid down in Tisch have been met. The 
general impression provided by these cases is that s 74 works well, is often 
non-controversial and requires no detailed consideration by the High Court. 
Indeed, it appears that s 74 works so well in the majority of cases that it is 
not clear why it is necessary to apply to the High Court at all. Surely, there 
must be an equally robust mechanism that does not involve cluttering up 
an already busy court with essentially non-contested matters. Gibbons notes 
that cases only “reach the courts when matters are in dispute”38 and, in his 
view, s 74 provides a crucial mechanism for unit title developments to avoid 
grid-lock issues caused by individual unit owners who “hold out” against 
decisions that would benefit others. However, a review of the cases indicates 
that matters need not be “in dispute” in a strict sense for an application under 
s 74 to be triggered. 
In a number of cases, the application to settle a scheme was driven by the 
failure of some (even one) unit title owner to engage with the process. There 
was essentially no argument or formal opposition and there was no particular 
“dispute”. Thus, while it is possible for all unit owners to reach a consensus 
on a remediation approach (which obviates the need to apply under s 74), this 
requires the active consent of every unit title holder. Where even one unit 
owner does not participate or provide consent, settlement of a scheme will be 
necessary. For example, in one recent case Katz J noted:39
[t]he Body Corporate has used its best endeavours, over 
several years, to try and get agreement as to an agreed plan 
of remediation. It has been unable to do so, however, due to 
a lack of engagement on the part of some of the unit owners.
In another case, it was noted that the application was necessary because not 
all unit owners had formally co-operated with the formation of the scheme, 
even though a unanimous resolution had been passed at an extraordinary 
general meeting.40 
Moreover, other cases demonstrate that disputes can be of a very minor 
nature. For example, in Body Corporate 361945 v Westpac New Zealand Ltd,41 
38 Thomas Gibbons “Season of the Tisch: A Response to Rod Thomas (Schemes under the Unit 
Title Regime)” (2012) 18 NZBLQ 147 at 157.
39 Body Corporate S897766 v Brocorp Properties Ltd [2015] NZHC 2891 at [30]. 
40 Body Corporate 312431 v Auckland Council [2015] NZHC 961. 
41 Body Corporate 361945 v Westpac New Zealand Ltd [2014] NZHC 1336.
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although there was no appearance for the respondent there was a division 
between unit owners as to the mode of cost apportionment under the scheme. 
However, the difference between the two positions was (in the context of a 
$4.5 million remediation) modest, generally being less than $2,000 and, for 
54 unit owners, less than $1,000.  
What these cases suggest is that there is a need to change the way the 
majority of applications under s 74 are dealt with. Currently, an application 
under s 74 must be made to the High Court by way of originating application,42 
which is designed to provide a relatively speedy and inexpensive mechanism 
for a miscellany of applications which need to be made to the Court under 
specific statutory provisions.43 Although a hearing date must be allocated at 
the time of filing the application,44 there does not appear to be any power 
for the High Court to determine the matter on the papers. Moreover, 
determination of the application by an Associate Judge of the High Court is 
not possible because it is not within their statutory jurisdiction.45 This can be 
contrasted to applications for summary judgment, which sometimes require 
similar decision making processes to s 74 applications, over which Associate 
Judges do have jurisdiction. Consequently, even if an essentially uncontested 
matter could be dealt with on the papers, it is still necessary for it to be dealt 
with by a High Court judge. This seems unnecessary where the application to 
settle a scheme under s 74 has no opposition and has been driven by either a 
very minor dispute or by a more general failure by unit title owners to engage 
in the process.46
A sensible solution to this would be to expand the jurisdiction of Associate 
Judges so that they have the power to settle a scheme under s 74 where it is 
appropriate to do so. Given the bulk of these cases are essentially uncontested 
(and are straight forward) this would provide both for the matter to be dealt 
with in an expedited and cost efficient manner,47 but also to ease the workload 
of High Court judges. 
This is not to say that all s 74 schemes could be dealt with in this way. 
Several of the cases reviewed raised substantive issues that were appropriately 
42 High Court Rules, r 19.2(za). 
43 Manchester Securities Ltd v Body Corporate 172108 [2015] NZCA 29 at [15].
44 High Court Rules, r 19.10.
45 See Senior Courts Act 2016, s 20.
46 Interestingly, the cost of bringing the application in this way is $540 (High Court Fees 
Regulations 2013, Schedule Fees Payable in Respect of Proceedings in Court, Item 3) (bearing 
in mind that if there is no respondent there is no scheduling or hearing fee) (High Court Fees 
Regulations 2013, reg 5). This can be contrasted with the dispute resolution provision of the 
Unit Titles Act 2010 itself, which indicates that in many instances disputes should go to the 
Tenancy Tribunal. The cost of this procedure is a fee of $850 for minor matters, but $3,300 
for all other disputes. This suggests that the dispute resolution provisions of the Act need 
reassessment more generally. See: Elizabeth Toomey, Jeremy Finn and Ben France-Hudson 
“Repairs, Renovation, Restoration, Demolition or Replacement of Multi-Dwelling Units on 
a Single Title: BRANZ Research Project” [2016] NZLJ 208-212.
47 It should be noted that there is no fee for filing an interlocutory application for summary 
judgment: High Court Fees Regulations 2013, Schedule Fees Payable in Respect of 
Proceedings in Court, Item 8. 
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within the remit of a defended hearing in the High Court. Generally, these 
cases can be broken down by theme and are illustrative of the need for the 
High Court to retain some involvement (rather than adopting an alternative 
dispute mechanism such as arbitration). 
Surprisingly, no case considers whether or not a scheme should be adopted. 
However, a number of cases consider the question of the appropriate form of 
the scheme.48 An excellent example is St Johns College Trust Board v Body 
Corporate No 197230.49 The complex had been damaged by water ingress 
and was made up of what were once four multi-storey buildings on separate 
properties, each having its own freehold title. It now comprised 110 units plus 
common property. The units had a mix of uses. Some were part of the original 
structures, others were new additions. The effect of the complex’s structure 
was that, under the Unit Titles Act 1972 (which was the legislation governing 
the dispute), some people responsible for contributing to body corporate 
levies would have to contribute toward the repair costs of exterior cladding 
of units and other common areas located in a different building from the one 
they owned and from which they would receive little or no benefit. The cost 
of repairs was approximately $4 million. The High Court, faced with a choice 
between four different schemes, refused to approve a number of schemes 
which had been proposed to change the respective burdens from the position 
under the Act. Duffy J did not consider it would be in the best interest of 
the unit owners as a whole to do so. Rather she approved a scheme that was 
consistent with and followed the purpose of the 1972 Act most closely.50 The 
Court of Appeal agreed. 
Conversely, in LV Trust Holdings Ltd v Body Corporate 114424,51 a 17-level 
residential tower required repair as a result of building defects that resulted 
in leaking. The unit holders, by majority, resolved to carry out the work 
required to fix the defects (amounting to about $5.4 million) and this work 
was done. The applicants owned a single unit in the development. They 
applied to the High Court for approval of a scheme under s 74. The body 
corporate was a respondent, and also presented its own scheme for approval. 
The key difference between the two schemes was the allocation of costs. The 
applicants owned the largest unit (it was over two floors) and, if the charges 
were to be assessed as proposed by the body corporate (supported by the 
majority of unit owners), they would pay considerably more than anyone else; 
by approximately $80,000. Under their proposed scheme they would still pay 
more, but not by quite so much. Asher J, referring to the factors outlined in 
Tisch, concluded that the fact the applicants were in a minority of one was far 
48 A further example can be seen in Law v Tan Corporate Trustee Ltd [2013] 1 NZLR 651.
49 St Johns College Trust Board v Body Corporate No 197230 [2013] NZCA 35, (2013) 14 NZCPR 
56.
50 St Johns College Trust Board v Body Corporate No 197230 [2012] NZHC 827. 
51 LV Trust Holdings Ltd v Body Corporate 114424 (2012) 14 NZCPR 344. This decision was 
unsuccessfully appealed by the Body Corporate (see Body Corporate 114424 v LV Trust 
Holdings Ltd [2014] NZCA 21, (2014) 7 NZ ConvC 96-008, (2014) 15 NZCPR 375. The 
Court of Appeal approved every aspect of Asher J’s reasoning). 
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from conclusive; majority support may do no more than reflect unfairness.52 
In his view, the extra payment by the applicants was not a fair levy in light 
of the benefits achieved. To charge an owner more simply because they had 
an additional floor (on which no relevant work was done) was unfair, and he 
settled the applicant’s scheme. 
A further type of case arises where a scheme has been settled, but there are 
arguments regarding decisions made under it.53 For example, in Body Corporate 
198245 v Wong,54 the High Court had settled a scheme to remediate a leaky 
complex involving 18 residential apartments and seven ground level retail 
units, which empowered the body corporate to raise levies. However, some of 
the retail unit holders refused to pay relevant levies on the basis that their unit 
required far less by way of remediation. They also argued, among other things, 
that elements of the building had been wrongly included as common property 
and should have been classified as private property. The body corporate sought 
recovery of the unpaid levies. The retail unit holders lost the argument on the 
basis that each owner had bought into the building as a whole and should 
be taken to have bought knowing the division between common and private 
property and what their responsibilities would be. Moreover, the scheme, 
which had already been settled, specifically acknowledged the arbitrariness 
of aspects of the divide between private and common property and had been 
approved on that basis. For the court to revisit these issues would undermine 
the basis of the scheme as it had been settled. 
Other cases consider what should happen when a unit owner cannot 
pay. In Body Corporate 201036 v Westpac,55 a scheme had been settled under 
s 74. A levy had been raised, and all but five unit owners had paid. The 
body corporate sought relief under s 74(7) (which allows the High Court to 
make any orders that it considers expedient or necessary) in respect of the 
defaulting owners. In essence, the body corporate wanted to be able to seize 
the defaulting owners’ ownership interest in satisfaction of their indebtedness. 
The central issue was whether the body corporate could use the scheme under 
s 74 as a vehicle for debt collection. The High Court decided that it could not 
be used in this way, with Thomas J concluding that using s 74(7) to obtain 
judgment against a defaulting unit owner would be to conflate the usual 
procedures. While this might be “expedient” it was not an appropriate use of 
s 74.56 The law has a process for debt collection and there is nothing in the 
Unit Titles Act 2010 to suggest that that process does not apply to bodies 
corporate. Moreover, as it stood, a forced sale would almost certainly not 
satisfy the debt owed to the body corporate, nor would it provide sufficient 
to discharge a mortgagee’s interest. However, if the repairs were undertaken 
using the body corporate’s power to borrow money for that purpose in the 
52 LV Trust Holdings Ltd v Body Corporate 114424 (2012) 14 NZCPR 344 at [61].
53 A further example can be seen in Body Corporate 173457 v Despy [2012] NZHC 1589.
54 Body Corporate 198245 v Wong (2012) 14 NZCPR 203.
55 Body Corporate 201036 v Westpac [2015] NZHC 1524.
56 At [45]. 
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interim, the value of the units would increase, allowing the unit owners to 
borrow further on their properties in order to discharge their debt to the body 
corporate. The orders sought were essentially procedural shortcuts and were 
draconian in nature.57 They were declined. 
Overall, a review of the cases decided under s 74 since 2011 suggests that 
the provision is working well. Proposed schemes are frequently settled by the 
High Court and in the majority of cases there is little, if any objection. This 
suggests that it may not be necessary for every case to be given due attention 
by a High Court judge. Nonetheless, there are cases where the quantum 
involved (often millions of dollars of repair work) and the substantive issues 
involved mean that it is an appropriate matter for the High Court to consider. 
A practical solution is to empower Associate Judges to consider applications 
under s 74 in the first instance. If appropriate the judge can settle a scheme. If 
complex issues that require a hearing are raised, the matter could be set down 
for consideration by a High Court judge. This would be a much more efficient 
approach that would potentially speed up resolution for the unit title owners, 
but also remove relatively simple matters to an appropriate forum. 
B. When Unit Titles Act Processes Break Down: Dealing with the Fallout 
While s 74 appears to be working well in many situations, the section is 
not always applicable. There are a number of cases that demonstrate the range 
of problems that can arise. 
One such recent case is OM Hardware Ltd v Body Corporate 303662.58 
Here a building in the Christchurch centre city contained a mix of ground-
floor commercial units and upper-level residential units. The building 
operated through a body corporate under the Unit Titles Act. The building 
was badly damaged by earthquakes, and demolition became necessary. The 
body corporate then claimed on its insurance policy. There was a major 
disagreement between the residential unit owners and the commercial unit 
owners because, when the initial allocation of ownership interests was carried 
out, it reflected the floor areas of the units, not their actual values. This 
was contrary to the Unit Titles Act, and was soon recognised as incorrect. 
However, no alternative allocation had been agreed. The residential unit 
owners successfully sought to have the insurance proceeds distributed on 
a retrospective assessment drawing on expert valuers’ advice, rather than 
on the incorrect initial scheme. It was critical that expert valuation based 
on sound data was available and, although there had been some change in 
relative values between the commercial and residential units over the years, 
the different valuations were remarkably similar. 
57 At [71].
58 OM Hardware Ltd v Body Corporate 303662 [2015] NZHC 190.
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A different result occurred in Dominion Finance Group Ltd (in Rec and 
Liq) v Body Corporate 382902 (“Gallery apartments”),59 where an apartment 
building was badly damaged in the Canterbury earthquakes and later had to 
be demolished. Again, there was a dispute as to the accuracy of the allocation 
of ownership interests, and disgruntled unit owners sought a retrospective 
revaluation. However, in this case the Court refused to order such an exercise 
because there were no good comparators to allow a reliable figure to be 
reached. The challenged allocation therefore stood.
Both cases may serve as cautionary tales which emphasise the need for 
bodies corporate and their members to ensure the Unit Titles Act is complied 
with fully, and that changing circumstances are reflected in changes to 
any allocation of interests and values. Of course, it may be more simple to 
emphasise the need for documents to be up-to-date than to procure agreement 
among the unit owners. 
C. A cautionary tale of an early settlement and a dodgy expert witness
Much ink has been spilt, by academics and judges alike, in advocating 
the desirability of the parties reaching early settlement of disputes. There 
is a cautionary tale from the Canterbury earthquakes which illustrates the 
potential pitfalls of eagerness to reach such a settlement.
The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Prattley Enterprises Ltd v 
Vero Insurance NZ60 ventilated two issues of interest. The first concerned an 
unsuccessful application for relief under the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 
brought by an insured under a policy of insurance which had been in force 
on a building in central Christchurch which was damaged in the September 
2010 earthquake and further and fatally damaged in 2011. The appellant 
building owner reached a settlement with Vero Insurance and, as part of that 
settlement, agreed to abandon all further claims arising out of the insurance 
policy. However, the appellants later contended that both parties had been 
mistaken as to the proper method of assessing the quantum of loss and, 
therefore, sought to set aside the settlement on the basis of common mistake. 
This failed for a number of reasons, including an inability to prove any actual 
mistake or any significant disparity in value, as well as an allocation of the 
risk of mistake to the building owner. (Thus the owners failed on every single 
head of the three elements required to be established for relief under the 
Act).61 Given the emphasis placed by the court on the high threshold needed 
to upset a settlement agreement on any grounds, it is clear that a rush to early 
59 Dominion Finance Group Ltd (in Rec and Liq) v Body Corporate 382902 (“Gallery apartments”) 
[2012] NZHC 3325, (2012) 7 NZ ConvC 96-003, (2012) 14 NZCPR 252.
60 Prattley Enterprises Ltd v Vero Insurance NZ [2016] NZCA 67. Since this article was submitted 
to the Canterbury Law Review the Supreme Court has heard and dismissed an appeal against 
the Court of Appeal decision: Prattley Enterprises Ltd v Vero Insurance Ltd [2016] NZSC 158. 
61  See s 6(1) Contractual Mistakes Act 1977. 
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settlement may be unwise if later events or legal developments indicate errors 
in assessing the benefits of the settlement.
The other point of real interest is that the case reveals some of the 
problems with “advisers” and “experts” who may be expected to flock to 
the scene of any significant disaster in the hopes of securing a share of the 
insurance or settlement monies available to victims of the disaster. One of 
the reasons that the building owner in the Prattley case sought to set aside 
the settlement agreement was the appearance on the scene of an overseas 
“expert” who advocated a novel method of calculating depreciation on the 
building under which the owners would have been entitled to more than 
10 times the sum for which they had actually settled. What is inexplicable 
is that this “expert” first acted as an advocate for the building owners, then 
entered into a litigation-funding arrangement with them for the action to set 
aside the settlement agreement, before finally appearing in the witness box as 
an alleged independent expert witness. The Court of Appeal was singularly 
unimpressed by this multiplicity of roles. Unfortunately, this is not the only 
case in Christchurch where litigants appear to have relied on advice from 
unreliable sources to advance unsustainable claims.
D. Negligence, Local Bodies and Commercial/Multiple use  
Buildings in New Zealand
In some cases, particularly the “leaky building syndrome” cases which 
have kept the New Zealand courts busy in recent years, property owners have 
sought to recoup their losses by suing the architects, builders and contractors 
who designed and constructed the building(s) in question, and the local body 
which had oversight of the construction and certification process. It can be 
expected that, in at least some future disasters, property owners, or their 
insurers, will also cast about for potential targets of litigation.
The leaky building litigation has led the courts to some clear statements of 
principle. Local bodies owe a duty of care to current and prospective owners 
of residential buildings to ensure that proper checks are done to ensure the 
buildings are properly designed and constructed.62 Builders of such residential 
buildings also owe a duty of care to future owners of the building to ensure 
design and construction are performed with due care.63 
When attention is turned to commercial buildings, or to mixed commercial 
and residential buildings, the position is somewhat less certain. In the 
Spencer on Byron case,64 the Supreme Court held that there was no reason to 
differentiate between residential and commercial buildings when imposing a 
62 North Shore City Council v Body Corporate 188529 (Sunset Terraces) [2011] 2 NZLR 289 
[2010] NZSC 158.
63 Mount Albert Borough Council v Johnson [1979] 2 NZLR 234 and Young v Tomlinson [1979] 2 
NZLR 441.
64 Body Corporate 207624 & Ors v North Shore City Council [2012] NZSC 83, [2013] 2 NZLR 
297.
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duty of care on local bodies. However, it is less clear that the duty owed by 
builders to subsequent owners of residential buildings has a counterpart in 
relation to commercial buildings. In dealing with an appeal on a strikeout 
application, the Court of Appeal in Blain v Evan Jones Construction Limited65 
considered that there was still some uncertainty as to the relevant law and 
the question of the existence and nature of any duty owed by a builder to the 
subsequent owner of a commercial building should be resolved at trial rather 
than on a strikeout application.66 
Some High Court cases have favoured extending builders’ liability. In 
2014 Woolford J took the view that the reasoning underlying the leading 
cases was:67
… supportive of a duty of care being owed in respect of all 
buildings regardless whether they are used as residences or 
for commercial purposes.
On that basis there was no need to differentiate between claims made by 
owners of commercial units within a building and other members of the body 
corporate who owned residential units.68 
Another Judge has used a more assertive form of words, with Venning J 
saying that, in the Spencer on Byron case, the Supreme Court had “confirmed 
there is no distinction between commercial buildings and other non-
residential premises” in relation to the duty owed by a builder to owners and 
subsequent owners of the building.69 
The position must thus be seen as unsettled but, at the very least, owners of 
commercial properties, or multiple use properties, now have a very substantial 
chance of being able to seek damages from either, or both, the builder and 
the local body should it be found that a building was negligently designed or 
constructed or its progress negligently vetted. 
E. The Contributory Negligence Issue 
Some issues have arisen in various cases as to the position of owners of 
units who had purchased the unit with actual or constructive knowledge 
of defects in the building. In one 2014 case, the Judge found an apartment 
owner to be contributorily negligent when they purchased their property after 
receipt of a comprehensive report indicating almost all the respects in which 
the building was defective. Damages were reduced by 75 per cent.70 However, 
the Judge was content to allow other owners who had purchased units in 
65 Blain v Evan Jones Construction Limited [2013] NZCA 680.
66 At [33].  
67 Body Corporate 321655 v Albert Park Holdings Ltd (formerly Clearwater Construction Ltd) (in 
liq) [2014] NZHC 2478 at [13]. 
68 At [18].
69 Minister for Education & Ors v WQT Ltd [2014] NZHC 2198 at [8]. 
70 Body Corporate 326421 v Auckland Council [2015] NZHC 862 at [305] –[310].
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the building, knowing of the potential defects, to rely on assignments of the 
rights of the previous owner when seeking damages.71 Damages recoverable 
by such assignee-plaintiffs did not include any general damages for distress 
and inconvenience.72
However, care is needed in setting up any scheme involving the assignment 
of such tortious claims. An unusual obstacle to litigation was encountered in 
the Fleetwood Apartments case.73 Here the Council had settled the claims of 
owners of units in the multi-dwelling unit on the basis of a payment to those 
owners and assignments to the Council of the owners’ claims against two 
other defendants, the builder and the architect. The agreement provided that 
the assignor owners would receive the first $200,000 recovered from those 
defendants and the council the next $1.5 million plus its legal costs on a 
solicitor and client basis. Any further monies recovered would be paid to the 
unit owners. Fogarty J held that the assignment was invalid as being contrary 
to public policy by undermining the law of maintenance and champerty and 
meddling with the trial process.74 
Much turned on the unusual financial elements in that case. The position 
is clearly different if the assignment is simply of the owner’s rights, as a new 
owner who has taken an assignment of the previous owner’s claim against the 
local body is likely to be seen as primarily acquiring a property right rather 
than an interest in litigation.75
F. The Residential/Commercial Building Conundrum – EQC,  
Tort and Weathertight Homes
The Earthquake Commission Act 1993 extends cover to all residential 
buildings which are the subject of a fire insurance policy.76 The definition of 
residential buildings in s 2 of the Act states (in part):
Residential building means— 
(a) Any building, or part of a building, or other structure 
(whether or not fixed to land or to another building, part, or 
structure) in New Zealand which comprises or includes one 
or more dwellings, if the area of the dwelling or dwellings 
constitutes 50 percent or more of the total area of the 
building, part, or structure: 
71 Body Corporate 326421 v Auckland Council [2015] NZHC 862.
72 At [278]. 
73 Body Corporate 160361 (Fleetwood Apartments) v BC 2004 Ltd [2014] NZHC 1514; [2014] 3 
NZLR 758. 
74 At [150].
75 Body Corporate 326421 v Auckland City Council, above n 70 at [283]. 
76 Earthquake Commission Act 1993, s 18.
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In turn, a “dwelling” is defined:
Dwelling means, subject to any regulations made under 
this Act, any self-contained premises which are the home or 
holiday home, or are capable of being and are intended by 
the owner of the premises to be the home or holiday home, 
of one or more persons. 
This simple formula for determining whether a building is, or is not, 
a residential building stands in contrast to other parts of the definition 
section, which give very precise figures as to the distance from the house for 
which damaged land or drains or pipes attracts EQC cover. While it may 
be surprising that such a simplistic criterion is used, it must be said that it 
appears to have been effective in preventing disputes and litigation.
It is clear that designers of new buildings and, perhaps particularly, 
developers seeking to remodel existing commercial or industrial buildings to 
a mix of uses, must be very aware of this limitation. Certainly, it is a serious 
disincentive to creating any multiple-use buildings which involve a minority 
amount of residential use. That may not be optimum in seeking to build more 
vibrant cities.
The definition also raises the question of whether the provision of 
commercial accommodation should be seen as part of a residential use or 
a commercial one, and thus excluded from the EQC coverage. It appears 
that, in Canterbury, EQC has generally taken the view that buildings which 
have a mix of short-stay apartments and owner-occupied apartments are to 
be classed as residential buildings. This may perhaps be a flow-on from the 
decision in Morley v EQC,77 which held that boarding-houses came within 
this statutory definition because each boarding house was “an entire self-
contained building and as such was self-contained premises being shared as 
a home by a number of individuals”,78 even though the individual residents 
shared communal kitchens and bathrooms. The Judge noted that it was 
common ground between the parties that rented accommodation was a 
“residential building” as opposed to a commercial property, even though the 
landlord had a commercial purpose in letting out the premises.79 Given that 
decision, it is perhaps not surprising that no later cases made any significant 
differentiation between apartments or flats rented on long-term tenancies and 
those let on very short terms of a week or two or even a few days.  
It is not clear why one form of commercial accommodation provision 
should be privileged over others in terms of EQC cover. Nor are the 
distinctions drawn by the EQC legislation maintained in other contexts.  
77 Morley v EQC [2013] NZHC 230. 
78 At [50]. 
79 At [49]. 
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In the tort litigation over the liability of local bodies, the ruling in 
the Spencer on Byron case also meant that rental accommodation was not 
distinguished from commercial property. In that case, almost all the units in 
the defective building were under management as hotel rooms.80 It may be 
interesting to see how such short-stay rental properties are to be treated if the 
courts maintain the stance that negligent builders may be liable to subsequent 
owners of residential properties but not to owners of commercial properties.  
The definitional issues have arisen in relation to the Weathertight Homes 
Resolution Services Act 2006. That Act allows owners of “dwellinghouses” 
affected by “leaky home syndrome” or “weathertightness issues” arising from 
faulty design and/or construction to have their cases dealt with relatively 
speedily through the Weathertightness Tribunal, at the cost of having to 
abandon their tort claims against the relevant local body and accept a lower 
sum but gaining the benefit of a government contribution to the remedial 
payments. 
The critical parts of the definition of “dwellinghouse” in s 8 of the Act are: 
dwellinghouse—
(a) means a building, or an apartment, flat, or unit within 
a building, that is intended to have as its principal use 
occupation as a private residence; and
…
(d)  does not include a hospital, hostel, hotel, motel, rest 
home, or other institution
That definition has given rise to some discussion in both the Courts and 
the Weathertightness Tribunal. The Tribunal had to consider eligibility in Re 
The Anchorage,81 where the building comprised a number of apartments which 
had been designed as private residences but had never been used as such. 
Instead, the apartments had been rented out generally on a short-stay basis. 
The Tribunal, however, gave primacy to the intended purpose of the owners 
to use the flats at some later time as a permanent or holiday home, rather than 
the actual use to which the units had been put.82 In Body Corporate 85978 v 
Wellington CC,83 the Court was dealing with a building in which there were 
100 residential units and a café. Twenty-one of the units were leased to the 
Quest hotel chain and used as hotel rooms. The Tribunal considered these 
units fell outside the statutory scheme but in the High Court a “bright line” 
test of the purpose at the time of construction was applied. Convenience, it 
appears, trumps reality.  
80 There were 248 hotel rooms and six residential flats: Body Corporate 207624 & Ors v North 
Shore City Council, above n 64, at [2]. 
81 Re The Anchorage [2012] NZWHT Auckland 33.
82 At [12] and [19]. 
83 Body Corporate 85978 v Wellington CC [2013] NZHC 2582. 
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A rather different challenge came in Townscape Akoranga Ltd v Auckland 
Council,84 where the issue arose, in the context of judicial review proceedings, 
whether student accommodation in the form of student flats was to be treated 
as a series of “dwellinghouses”. Heath J considered the statutory definition at 
length, holding that the use of the term “private dwellinghouse” imported a 
test of privacy: 85
The exceptions to the term “dwellinghouse” are the antithesis 
of a residence that has the usual characteristics of privacy 
inherent in it. Generally speaking, hospitals, hostels, hotels, 
motels, and rest-homes are not used principally as a private 
residence.
The student residences were, he considered, akin to serviced apartments 
rather than hotels, hostels and the other enumerated exclusions, and were 
therefore “private dwellinghouses”.  
The inclusion of such accommodation as dwellinghouses is, perhaps, close 
to the line on a reading of the statute alone. However, it seems less contestable 
if units in a building which are managed as hotel rooms are “dwellinghouses” 
and thus covered by the weathertightness scheme. Certainly the owners of 
such commercially-exploited units are free to seek remedies in tort against the 
local body and, perhaps, the builder. Questions may still be raised about the 
appropriateness of EQC cover. 
IV. The Importance of “Well-Being” Housing Models  
A theme running through this project is to study the importance of 
“well-being” housing models. As society is forced by housing constraints to 
live in more confined environments, we are investigating models in which 
a tighter community can live harmoniously. The cross lease model with its 
dual ownership structure attracts significant discord. Arguments arise about 
structural additions that have been done without a co-owner’s consent,86 
failure of co-owners to consent to alterations,87 removal of dwellings,88 
entitlements over the common property (usually the driveway)89 or over 
restricted user areas90 and the like. The unit title model of ownership presents 
its own discrete problems including: basic administrative problems regarding 
84 Townscape Akoranga Ltd v Auckland Council [2013] NZHC 2367.  
85 At [52]. 
86 See, for instance, Hogg v Edwards HC Rotorua CP142/86; Song v Chai HC Auckland CIV-
2011-404-422, 30 June 2011; Smallfield v Brown (1992) 2 NZ ConvC 19,110.     
87 See, for instance, Walsh v Studd HC Auckland CIV-2002-404-2030, 2 July 2003.
88 See, for instance, Williams v Cammock HC Hamilton CP48/99, 4 August 1999; Smallfield v 
Brown, above n 86. 
89 See, for instance, Lipp v Chaney [2012] NZHC 1761.   
90 See, for instance, Enjoin Twenty Four Ltd v Van Tilborg (1991) 1 NZ ConvC 190,989; Bain v 
Finlayson HC Auckland CP 1153/92, 13 October 1992; Sang v Lewis [1994] DCR 373. 
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the structure of bodies corporate, their powers, and their oversight and 
regulation; disputes regarding the form of any required remediation, repair 
or rebuild and the allocation of associated costs; disputes about the allocation 
of ownership interests and the consequences where unforeseen events lead to 
calls for retrospective amendment; and the allocation of responsibility in tort 
and the impact of contributory negligence.
There are a number of studies concerning the relationship between 
a housing environment and well-being. City planners considering the 
replacement of high-density housing should take the opportunity to improve 
the actual physical rebuilding of a community. 
In an Australian and New Zealand Health Impact Assessment Report,91 
alongside positive aspects of high density housing (which must also be taken 
into account in any re-design), such as increased affordability of housing, 
improved access to service and co-ordination for disadvantaged groups, 
lowered number of cars per household and increased personal safety around 
roads, walkways and cycleways, negative health impacts included: 
• lack of play areas for children;
• risk of safety for children from windows and balconies;
• creation of inequity gradients in forming “ghettos”; 
• increased alcohol-related harm; 
• loss of amenity depending on design; 
• increased cost of living and intensification; and  
• increased pollution exposure.    
While the Report identified many recommendations that targeted the 
impacts of a broader built urban environment, there were only a few recurring 
recommendation themes that focused specifically on housing density. From 
these more limited sources, the Report collated a very valuable “wish-list” for 
any city rebuilding high density housing:
• provision be made for people that cover a range of ages: for example, 
children for their “free will movement”92 with open play spaces;93 
• seeking strategies to ensure the delivery of diverse housing types for the 
elderly, disabled and singles; 
91 Harris, Harris-Roxas et al, 2007, Australian and New Zealand Health Impact Assessment 
Report. This research was conducted between 2005 and 2010 following research from 
web sources such as HIA Connect, Health Impact Assessment Gateway, World Health 
Organisation, International Health Impact Consortium, and International Association for 
Impact Assessment. [Please note citations in footnotes 91-99 are retained in the style of the 
Report].   
92 R Quigley and J Ball (2007). Wellbeing Assessment of the Draft Far North District Kerikeri-
Waipapa Structure Plan, Quigley and Watts Pty Ltd. Public Health Specialists.
93 R Jaine (2008) Health Impact Assessment of the Regional Policy Statement Regional Forms 
and Energy Draft Provisions. Prepared for the Regional Public Health.  
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• access opportunities for recreation and open space;94 
• restricting urban sprawl by monitoring land release and seek land  
development sites close to the town centre;95
• active transport options and increased physical activity;96 
• cycleways and walkways;97 
• local retail and services;98 and
• appropriate development and building standards to improve safety for 
children and residents.99
V. Conclusion   
Shared ownership models of land use are part and parcel of our modern 
environment. They come with their own suite of problems, some of which 
remained latent until Canterbury suffered a series of very damaging 
earthquakes. While other problems have existed for a long time, the courts 
still struggle with sensible solutions. There is much public angst over the 
effectiveness of our current Unit Titles Act 2010. While s 74 of the Act 
appears to be working well in many situations, the section is not always 
applicable and this leads to complex issues, perhaps the most contentious 
being insurance entitlement. Who to sue when things go wrong, the role of 
EQC, and whether an owner should take some blame for a problem are often 
part of a litigator’s brief. Most of the current problems with cross leases would 
never have occurred if the Law Commission’s phasing-out suggestion had 
been implemented 17 years ago.   
 
94 Quigley and Ball, above n 92.
95 GSAHS, G.S.A.H.S.P.H. (2007). Bungendore Health Impact Assessment Progress Report 
on outcomes, Greater Southern Area Health Service population Health. 
96 Quigley and Ball, above n 92.
97 Quigley and Ball, above n 92.
98 K Tennant, C Newman, et al (2010) Health Impact Assessment Summary Report: Parramatta 
City Council’s Draft Local Environment Plan, Sydney Western Area Health Service: Centre 
for Population Health. 
99 J Ozanne-Smith, J Guy et al. (2008) The relationship between slips, trips and falls and the 
design and construction of buildings. Monash University Accident Research Centre. 
